Augmentation of Assets by Means of Cash Items by Bonaparte, Harry
128 LAW JOURNAL
states the principle behind these early cases: "Where a proceeding has been
had in the nature of a proceeding in rem, whenever the judgment is drawn
in question in another action affecting the same property or subject-matter,
the facts found by the first tribunal which were necessary to the formation of
the sentence pronounced are conclusive of the existence of such facts and can
never be the subject of inquiry upon a subsequent investigation in another
tribunal more than the sentence itself. Pinso= v. Ivey, 9 Tenn. 349 (1830),
United States v. Hooe, 3 Cranch. 73, (18o6), Fitzsimmons v. Newport Ins.
Co., 4 Cranch. 195, (x8o8), Gelstern v. Hoyt, 3 Wheat, z46, (i8i8),
Jewett v. Jewett, 6 Mass. 277, (18 1O).
The more recent cases disclose that the courts still adhere to this doctrine.
In In re Bloom's Estate, (Cal.) 293 P 633, (1931), the court held that "a
proceeding for the probate of a will is one instituted for the purpose of estab-
lishing the status of a written instrument; while the order admitting the same
to probate is conclusive in subsequent proceedings as to the ultimate fact of
the will, it is not save as to the parties litigant, or for the purpose of the pro-
ceeding itself, conclusive as to the facts upon which the question of will or no
will depends." Sorenson v Sorenson, 68 Neb. 483, 103 N. W 455, (903),
Clapp v. Vatcher, 9 Cal. App. 46z, 99 P 549, (i9o8), Gasquet v. Fenner,
247 U. S. 16, 38 S. Ct. 46, 6z L. Ed. 956, (1918).
Two comparatively recent New York decisions involved facts very similar
to those presented in the principal case. The court in In re Rowe, 197 App.
Div 449, 189 N. Y S. 395, (1921), stated, "A decrees of the Surrogate
Court in proceedings to have an administrator of the estate of an absentee
appointed is in no event an adjudication with respect to the time of the
death of the absentee and binding on the surrogate of another county in a
proceeding in which the exact date is material, since the date was not neces-
sary to be established with exactness, and all the surrogate had to determine
was that the absentee was presumed to be dead prior to the issuance of letters
and accordingly fixed the date as the date of the decree authorizing the letters
to issue." Affirmed without opinion, 232 N. Y 554, 134 N. E. 569. To
the same effect is Bering v. United States Trust Co. of New York, 2oI App.
Div. 35, 193 N. Y S. 753, (1922).
While the court in the principal case cites no authority for its statement
as to the conclusiveness of a finding as to the date of death, the decision is in
accord with the doctrine established elsewhere by a long line of cases.
JAMES R. TRITSCHLER.
AUGMENTATION OF ASSETS BY MEANS
OF CASH ITEMS
The Union Trust Co. was named trustee and distributing agent in con-
nection with a bond issue put out by the plaintiff, the University of Dayton.
It was provided in the trust instrument that the plaintiff was to make periodical
payments into a fund out of which the trustee was to discharge the interest
and the principal on the bonds. The first payment was made by a check
drawn by plaintiff on its account in the commercial department of the trustee
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bank in favor of the trust department. The books of the bank show that this
check was deposited by the trust department in its "Uninvested Trusts Funds"
account with the commercial department. Subsequently, the Union Trust
Co., being insolvent, was taken over by the defendant, the State Superintend-
ent of Banks and the official liquidator. Plaintiff seeks payment in full of its
check, claiming a preference. The preference was denied. Fulton v. The
University of Dayton, 129 Ohio St. 9 o , Ohio Bar Jan. 14, 1935 (Decided
Nov. 27, 1934). The relationship between the trust department and the
commercial department was treated as debtor and creditor, as the result of the
enactment of Section 71o-165 General Code, which authorizes the trust
department of a bank to make a deposit in its commercial department. The
plaintiff has no "ownership" on which to base his claim, according to the
construction placed on this statute in McDonald v. Fulton, 125 Ohio St. 507,
18z N. E. 504 (1932).
The earlier law of Ohio, as elsewhere, was that money had no earmarks,
and that the title of its owner was gone if it was mingled with other money.
Hence if a trustee mingled trust money with his own, or permitted another
to mingle it, the cestui que trust, being unable to trace, could not claim a pref-
erence. 5 Ohio Jur. 509, and cases there cited. This early law was changed
in Knatchbull v. Hallett, L. R. 13 Ch. Div. 696 (t88o). It was there held
that the title of the owner of money would survive a wrongful commingling
of it by one possessed of it as trustee. Hence if the amount of money in the
commingled fund was at all times greater than that of the trust fund, the
cestui que trust met the requirement of tracing. If withdrawals from the
general fund were made by the trustee, this case lays down the rule that he is
presumed to be honest, and to be withdrawing his own money and not that of
the cestui que trust. But if the sum of money of the general fund was ever
reduced to an amount less than the sum of the trust fund, the presumption
was rebutted, and the cestui que trust was entitled only to the amount of
money remaining. This doctrine seems to be approved by the Ohio courts.
Jones v. Kilbreth, 49 Ohio St. 401, 31 N.E. 346 (1892), The Mad River
National Bank v. Meihorn, 8 0. C. C. 191 (1894), Orme v. Baker, 74
Ohio St. 337, 78 N. E. 439 (19o6), Smith v. Fuller, 86 Ohio St. 57, 99
N. E. 214 (1912).
Section 7o-165, General Code, however, was amended in 1932, 115
Ohio Laws 287, by adding the following: "But in case of the insolvency,
closing or suspension of such trust company or bank, claims for such moneys
hereafter so deposited in any other department of such trust company or bank
shall be impressed with a trust for the payment thereof." This amendment
was not applicable to the principal case because it had not become law when
the cause arose. But its effect in allowing the cestui que trust to claim a pref-
erence out of the "property and assets," or the general estate of the bank,
coupled with a dictum in Fulton v. The University of Dayton respecting
augmentation by cash items, presents a potential problem worthy of note.
The difficulty will present itself when a case arises in which the cash in the
vaults has been exhausted during the last days the bank was open. This is
suggested near the end of the opinion where Bevis, J. said, "The result might
have been otherwise" had the statute been applicable.
The theory of augmentation as stated by Judge Bevis in this dictum, was
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in reply to the argument advanced in behalf of the plaintift in error, that
the University of Dayton could claim a preference only if its check was con-
verted into cash, which cash was deposited in the vaults of the bank at the
time of its closing. His words were: "It clearly 'proves too much'--it would
lead to a situation where a bank, acting as trustee, would have to perform its
duties with segregated quantities of cash, to which ownership in equity could
definitely attach. Such a course, while actually possible, is practically never
pursued because of its inconvenience. Instead, checks and other instruments
are frequently treated 'as if' they were cash." He then quotes with approval
from Schumacher v. Harriett, 5z Fed. (zd) 817, 8z A. L. R. 1 (1931), the
following: "Under modern banking conaitions, the rule as stated should be
held to apply to cash items received under a trust agreement as well as to cash
so received. Such an item for practical purposes differs not at all from cur-
rency In other words, we think that a cash item, which is accepted by a
bank as cash and fulfills for it the functions of cash, must be treated as cash
in determining whether the cash remaining in the bank is subject to a trust
because of the commingling of the trust funds." After quoting from other
cases, Bevis, J. concludes: "If the reasoning of these cases is correct, it would
seem to follow that a trust may be established without tracing the check de-
posited into actual cash in the vaults. If the value represented by the check
can be followed through the bank's books into assets belong to the bank
when it closed, the requirements of the modern law are satisfied." (Italics-
mine.)
Some courts draw a sharp distinction between cash and cash items as to
the capabilities of each to augment a fund. This distinction is warranted since
an actual difference does exist. The term "cash items" is usually used by
courts with reference to checks, but in its broadest sense it includes all com-
mercial paper which a bank accepts in lieu of money. For example if bank
A receives a check drawn on bank B, it is generally set off against checks which
B holds for payment by A, or if bank A receives a check in which it is drawee,
the result is a diminution of A's liability to the depositor and an increase of its
liability to the one for whom the proceeds of the check are intended. In
neither case has there been an augmentation of the "cash in the vaults" of the
bank. In Larabee Flour Mills v. First National Batik, 13 Fed. (2d) 330,
(C. C. A. 1926), the court showed that it was aware of the problem by the
following words: "It is difficult to explain or to understand by what equitable
right one who has not contributed to the creation of a fund should be given
a special or superior interest therein." In Hecker-Jones-Jewell Milling Co.
v. Cosmopolitan Trust Co., 242 Mass. 181, 136 N. E. 333 (i92z), the
court, in regard to the receipt of a check by the insolvent bank, said: "It was
the mere lessening of one of its debts, and productive of nothing even remotely
suggesting a 'res' for a trust." Substantially the same position was taken in
Rorebeck v. Benedict Flour & Feed Co., 26 Fed. (2d) 440 (C. C. A. 1928).
For an exhaustive treatment of the question, see cases collected in 8z A. L. R.
46.
However, the importance which the court in the principal case expressly
attached to "modern banking conditions" and the implied judicial notice
which it takes of the customs and usages preaviling among bankers are signifi-
cant. These unequivocal statements and quotations of Judge Bevis would lead
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one to conclude that in the eyes of the Ohio Supreme Court cash and cash
items are equivalent. The significance of this dictum becomes apparent when
it is considered in connection with the amended statute, since the combination
seems to pave the way for the revival of the augmentation doctrine in Ohio to
the extent that the cestui que trust has a preferred claim, regardless of whether
his assets, which were commingled or misused, were in the form of cash or
cash items.
Should a case in which it is claimed that augmentation had resulted
from the receipt of cash items arise, the recent case of Huntington Natwnal
Bank v. Fulton, 3Z 0. N. P (N. S.) 141 (Ohio Law Bulletin and Reporter,
May zi, 1934), decided under the amended statute, would be of interest.
In this case the augmentation was in the form of a balance in the insolvent
bank's favor after a clearing transaction. Bank clearings, mere bookkeeping
entries, are even more distinguishable from cash than cash items, and it is
more difficult to conceive of their augmenting "cash in vaults", nevertheless
the court held that the plaintiff was entitled to a preference. This holding
could serve as the basis for an a fortiori argument which might be instrumen-
tal in influencing the Ohio courts to transform the dictum of Fulton v. Urm-
vtrsity of Dayton into law.
In the last analysis this whole problem resolves itself into a question of
policy- should courts favor the general creditors, or should they increase the
remedies of those occupying the position of cestuis que trustent. Legislative
policy, as evidenced by the amended statute, is in accord with the latter alter-
native. Judicial policy, as evidenced by the obiter dictum of the principal
case, points toward an extension of that which the Legislature has initiated.
These two afford a basis for augmentation by means of cash items.
HARRY BONAPARTE.
THE RIGHT OF A MURDERER TO ACQUIRE
THE PROPERTY OF HIS VICTIM
The case of Hodapp v. Olaff, 17 Ohio Abs. 543, decided May 19, 1934,
in Montgomery County raises the much controverted question of whether a
murderer may acquire and retain the property of his victim. In this case, one,
Apostol Milvanos, opened a joint account for himself and another, Tago
Milvanos, as authorized under Sec. 9648, General Code. Later he went to
Greece where at the instance of Tago, he was murdered. Tago was sub-
sequently convicted under Greek law of being the "moral author of the
crime." The question presented to the court was whether the murderer or
the heirs of Apostol should take tile to the account.
There are four situations in which this question may arise: first, where a
legatee or devisee murders his testator; second, where an heir murders his
ancestor; third, where a beneficiary in an insurance policy murders the in-
sured, and, fourth, where one joint owner takes the life of the other. It
would seem that the solution to the problem in each of these cases would be
identical, but an examination of the cases reveals three distinct views.
The first solution is that a murderer may acquire nothing at all from
